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ABSTRACT
Information Systems literature emphasizes the importance of efficient contracts for managing outsourcing relationships.
However, there is a lack of proven and tested contract designs in theory as well as in practice. With the help of Economic
Theory we analyze the underlying dynamics of an outsourcing relationship. Based on mathematical Principal-Agent-Theory
we aim at answering the following questions: (1) ‘what are the characteristics of an ‘optimal’ outsourcing contract?’ and (2)
‘how can the Outsourcer contractually implement incentives for the Service Provider?’. Our theoretical findings stress that
within an ‘optimal’ contract the marginal utilities of both parties involved have to be proportional. For practical implications
this means that an increase of the Service Provider’s profit has to be accompanied by a decrease in the Outsourcer’s costs. To
accomplish this we show how incentives can contractually be implemented as suggested by Principal-Agent-Theory. We test
our findings based on a single case study research.
Keywords
Principal-Agent-Theory, Outsourcing Relationship, Contract
INTRODUCTION
The examination of outsourcing — the purchase of a good or service that was previously provided internally (Lacity and
Hirschheim, 1993) — has been a domain of Information Systems (IS) research for several years now. Within an outsourcing
relationship the contract is an important tool to attain the expected benefits. The importance of a contract as one of several
key success factors within an outsourcing relationship has been stressed by various researchers (e.g. Kern (1997) and Useem
and Harder (2000)). However, there is a lack of research on the choice and design of contract mechanisms (Aubert, Houde,
Patry and Rivard, 2003). Based on Economic Theory we aim at analyzing the prerequisites of an ‘optimal’ contract.
Therefore, we combine insights derived from Principal-Agent-Theory to IS research on outsourcing relationships.
Within IS literature Principal-Agent-Theory is mentioned as an appropriate tool to analyze problems between two parties due
to the asymmetric distribution of information (Loh, 1994). However, most principal-agent-related research on IS contracts
comprises only a ‘verbal’ discussion of the positive problem. Our research focuses on normative (mathematical) analysis. Our
goal is to identify characteristics of an ‘optimal’ contract (in the sense of pareto-efficiency) which incorporates true sharing of
risk and return. We also demonstrate how respective incentive mechanisms can be implemented.
Based on the Outsourcer’s perspective, we therefore aim at answering the following research questions:
· What are the characteristics of an ‘optimal’ outsourcing contract?
· How can the Outsourcer contractually implement incentives for the Service Provider?
To approach these research questions we first provide a brief overview of the Principal-Agent-Problem as a research
framework (section 2). Then, section 3 focuses on the formal derivation of the Principal-Agent-Problem. We introduce the
so-called first and second best solution. Within the course of this paper we relate our theoretical findings to an example of the
outsourcing of IT-Infrastructure-Services. Section 4 analyzes these results and suggests implications for practical outsourcing
contracts. In section 5, we empirically test our findings with the help of case study analysis. Section 6 points to the limitations
of this research and highlights the main contributions.
RESEARCH FRAMEWORK: INTRODUCTION TO PRINCIPAL-AGENT-THEORY
Within Economic Theory, the main focus of Principal-Agent-Theory is to explain how to design a contractual relationship
which employs information asymmetry in an efficient way (Dibbern, 2003). In most contractual relationships the parties
involved do not have perfectly congruent goals and therefore a contract is developed to detail their relationship (Eisenhardt,
1989a). Ross (1973) first introduced the canonical Principal-Agent-Problem. An Agency-Problem can be defined as a
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contract under which a principal engages another person — the agent — to perform a service on their behalf. This involves
delegating some decision-making authority to the agent. This is, for example, true for an Outsourcer (principal) who
purchases services from a Service Provider (agent).
If both parties are utility maximizers it can be assumed that the agent will not always act in the best interest of the principal.
The source of moral hazard is an asymmetry of information among individuals that results in the fact that individual actions
cannot be observed and hence contracted upon (Holmström, 1979). The principal can limit divergences from their interest by
establishing appropriate incentives for the agent. Furthermore, monitoring can help to limit the diverging activities.
Therefore, many phenomena within contractual relationships such as asymmetric information between a principal and an
agent and as a consequence thereof the existence of agency conflicts can be explained by considerations of the Principal-
Agent-Theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973).
Agency-Theory has developed along two lines: positive and normative Agency-Theory (Eisenhardt, 1989a). Positive
Agency-Theory is more concerned with a verbal description of Principal-Agent-Relationships and the analysis of methods
used to set-up and monitor contracts (Demsetz, 1999). In comparison with the positivist strand normative Agency-Theory is
abstract and mathematical (Dibbern, 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989a). A detailed understanding of the underlying mathematical
assumptions is therefore necessary to ‘verbally’ analyze the Principal-Agent-Problem and to determine possible solutions.
The following research is based on normative Agency-Theory.
FORMAL DERIVATION OF THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT-PROBLEM
In this section we develop the Principal-Agent-Problem in situations of moral hazard. We show how the optimal sharing rule
can be formally derived. This approach is based on research conducted by Harris and Raviv (1978), Holmström (1979) and
Ross (1973). In the next section the common underlying assumptions are introduced. Then, the basic first and second best
optima are presented. The ‘first best optimum’ comprehends the case of symmetrically distributed (i.e. perfect) information.
The expression ‘second best optimum’ refers to asymmetrically distributed information. These expressions are notions taken
from the Principal-Agent-Theory. Finally, the so-called Likelihood-Ratio is introduced. The result of this section — namely
the optimal sharing rule — builds the foundation for our analysis introduced in the subsequent section.
Assumptions
In the following the outsourcing of IT-Infrastructure-Services is being analyzed as a Principal-Agent-Problem, with the
Outsourcer (ð principal) desiring some services to be performed. They assign this work to a Service Provider (ð agent) due
to specialized expertise on the part of the agent. We take up the standard Principal-Agent-Model assumptions, namely (1)
goal incongruence and (2) information asymmetries.
In the Principal-Agent-Relationship the Service Provider privately takes an action Aa Î , with A  as the set of all  possible
actions. a  is a productive input with direct disutility for the Service Provider. This creates an inherent difference in
objectives between both parties. In our example, the Service Provider can choose different levels of effort (i.e. regarding time
and quality). The Service Provider’s effort a  cannot be perfectly observed by the Outsourcer without incurring prohibitive
monitoring costs. Within their relationship the Outsourcer and the Service Provider agree upon an outcome x  to be
determined by compliance with the agreed upon contract (i.e. delivery of the defined IT-Infrastructure). This outcome x
depends not only on effort a  but also on the random state of nature q  ( WÎq  the state space set), such that )( qaxx = .
This means that outcome x  is determined by the Service Provider’s decisions and actions concerning the means of fulfilling
the requested service as well as by the random state of nature q  (e.g. electrical power outage, etc.). The share of x  that goes
to the Service Provider is denoted by )(xs , with xxs <)(  and 0)( ³xs . In our example of IT-Infrastructure-Services this
share can be understood as a fee payable to the Service Provider. Accordingly, )(xsx -  is  the  share  that  goes  to  the
Outsourcer representing the Outsourcer’s profit. The challenge is to determine an incentive compatible contract that incites
the Service Provider to ‘do their best’ when providing the service.
It is assumed that both the Outsourcer and the Service Provider hold state independent von-Neumann-Morgenstern-Utility-
Functions, )(xG  and ),( axH . They act as to maximize their expected utility. In reality, companies do not base their
business on utility functions but on cost and profit calculations. Therefore, the Outsourcer’s utility can, for example, be
understood as a decrease of costs as this is often an objective pursued by outsourcing (Lacity and Willcocks, 1998). The
Service Provider’s utility can, for example, be interpreted as a profit increase implying that the compensation they receive is
larger than their input for providing the IT-Infrastructure-Service. This is reflected in the model by assuming that
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)())((),( aVxsUaxH -=  with 0>¢V  and 0³ax . This means that the Service Provider’s utility function ),( axH  is
defined by the payoff with respect to the action a . It is denoted by the difference between the payment from the Outsourcer
))(( xsU  and their own cost for the related action )(aV . The constraints regarding V ¢  and ax  ensure that the Service
Provider minimize their costs for the related action and that they receive a payoff 0³x .
It is assumed that the Service Provider is risk-averse leading to 0<¢¢U . The Outsourcer may be or may not be risk-neutral,
i.e. 0£¢¢G . The Outsourcer observes only x  and not a . x  can be seen as a signal for the unobserved action a . Therefore,
the sharing rule has to be a function of x  alone.
Summing up it is assumed that )())((),( aVxsUaxH -=  is valid under the following conditions: (i) 0,0 >¢¢>¢ VV
considering the Service Provider’s objective to minimize costs, (ii) 0,0 <¢¢>¢ UU  considering the Outsourcer’s objective
to maximize payoff, (iii) 0,0 £¢¢>¢ GG  considering the Outsourcer’s risk-neutrality or non-risk-neutrality, (iv) 0³ax
considering the dependency of the payoff on action a .
Generic Formal Model
The basic model assumes that the Outsourcer observes only the outcomes they receive from the Service Provider. The
Outsourcer is not able to observe action aˆ  actually taken by the Service Provider. Therefore, the sharing rule has to be
defined by x  alone. The output x  is understood as a signal for the action which is not directly observed. Both parties have
the same information about the probability distribution. Therefore, it is assumed that the Outsourcer and the Service Provider
agree on a probability distribution of q . Before q  is known, the Service Provider chooses a .
The pareto-optimal sharing rule )(xs  is generated by the following model:
{ }))((max
)(
xsxG
xs
- Outsourcer’s objective (1) subject to
HaxsH ³)),(( Participation constraint (2)
{ }axsHa
Aa
ˆ)),((maxarg
Îˆ
Î Incentive constraint (3)
Constraint (1) describes the Outsourcer’s objective of maximizing their utility depending on their payoff, i.e. the difference of
outcome x  and the share that goes to the Service Provider )(xs . The participation constraint (2) guarantees the Service
Provider a minimum of expected utility withH , ),(0 axHH ££ . The incentive constraint (3) reflects the restriction that
the Outsourcer is not able to observe the action aˆ actually chosen by the Service Provider. The notion ‘arg max’ denotes the
set of arguments that maximize the objective function that follows.
First and Second Best Solution
Usually, the random state of nature q  is disregarded in Principal-Agent-Models. The outcome x  is parameterized with the
variable a . Therefore – in the continuous case – the density function ),( axf  can be derived with its partial derivations af
and aaf  defined for all ),( ax  (Jewitt, 1988).
The sharing rule of )(xs can now be generated by the following model (Holmström, 1979):
ò
+
-
-
x
x
dxaxfxsxG ),())((max Outsourcer’s objective (4)
[ ] HdxaxfaVxsU
x
x
³-ò
+
-
),()())(( Participation constraint (5)
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¢=
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x
a aVdxaxfxsU Incentive constraint (6)
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First-Best-Solution
Determining the first-best-optimum is based on a kind of a ‘thought experiment’: it is assumed that all information is
distributed symmetrically between the two parties involved. This means that the Outsourcer is able to observe all actions
taken by the Service Provider at no cost. They are therefore also able to determine whether or not the Service Provider
behaves in their interest. The Outsourcer defines a contract that maximizes their own expected utility considering a minimum
expected utility for the Service Provider. The optimal contract under symmetric information can be determined by optimizing
the Outsourcer’s objective (4) and the participation constraint (5). Within symmetrically distributed information the incentive
constraint (6) has to be disregarded as the action chosen by the Service Provider is directly observable for the Outsourcer.
With the help of a Lagrangian optimization, the following result can be derived.
l=
¢
-¢
))((
))((
xsU
xsxG
            Optimal contract under symmetric information   (7)
Equation (7) represents the first-best-solution implying ‘optimal’ (i.e. pareto-efficient) sharing. This ‘optimal’ sharing rule
under symmetric information is defined by the ratio of the first derivative of the Outsourcer’s utility function G¢  and the first
derivative of the Outsourcer’s payment to the Service Provider U ¢ . It can be concluded that within the first-best-solution the
marginal utilities of both parties involved have to be proportional to each other to arrive at an ‘optimal’, compatible contract.
With respect to the outsourcing example, this means that the decrease in costs for the Outsourcer has to be proportional to the
Service Provider’s profit increase.
Second-Best-Solution
If information between the Outsourcer and the Service Provider is distributed asymmetrically then only the second-best-
solution can be realized. This means that the Outsourcer is not able to observe any actions taken by the Service Provider.
They cannot determine whether or not the Service Provider behaves in their interest.
Therefore, an incentive constraint (6) is being introduced. This constraint should provide the Service Provider with an
incentive to choose an action that is in the best interest of the Outsourcer. The necessary participation (5) and incentive (6)
constraint are induced by partial differentiation of the Lagrange Function (8).
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Lagrangian optimization (8)
If the Lagrangian yields are optimized pointwise the ‘optimal’ sharing rule can be denoted as follows:
),(
),(
))((
))((
axf
axf
xsU
xsxG aml +=
¢
-¢
Optimal sharing rule (9)
In (9) an optimal contract is implicitly being defined. It is assumed that both sides of equation (9) only adopt positive values.
The ratio of marginal utilities ensures a ‘fair’ sharing of risk and reward. As for practical implications, this means that an
increase of the Service Provider’s profit (e.g. based on economies of scale or scope) has to be accompanied by a decrease in
the  Outsourcer’s  costs.  In  turn,  if  the  profit  of  the  Service  Provider  sinks,  they  may  increase  the  fees  payable  by  the
Outsourcer.
l  is the Lagrange-multiplier for the participation constraint and m  is the Lagrange-multiplier for the incentive constraint.
Both, l  and m  are constant for all possible solutions. Therefore, as (9) shows the fee payable to the Service Provider does
not solely depend on the relationship of the marginal utilities but also on the quotient
),(
),(
axf
axfa . This ratio is called
Likelihood-Ratio  and  plays  a  key  role  in  determining  the  respective  fee.  It  is  therefore  presented  in  further  detail  in  the
following section.
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Likelihood-Ratio
Mirrlees (1976) assumes a dependency of the probability and density function regarding action a  which can be described by
)|()( axfxf = . This assumption reflects a first order stochastical dominance, which means that high effort being made by
the Service Provider makes higher results more probable. If the Service Provider increase their effort, the density for a
determined result changes according to )|( axffa = . The quotient
),(
),(
axf
axfa  is called Likelihood-Ratio. This ratio refers to
output x  and determines when this output can be used as a ‘sound’ signal for the effort regarding a  taken by the Service
Provider.
To  explain  the  relevance  of  this  ratio  in  further  detail,  we  disregard  the  continuous  case  for  a  moment  and  focus  on  the
discrete case where only two actions are distinguished. We assume that the Service Provider can choose between a high Ha
and a low La  effort level with Ha > La . The respective output levels created by these effort levels are Hx  and Lx  with
LH xx > .
A Likelihood-Ratio is given if: ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0>- HLLHLLHH axaxaxax  respectively ( )( )
( )
( )LL
LH
HL
HH
ax
ax
ax
ax
> . Within that equation
( )HH ax  is  the  short  form of ( )HH aqqx |= . The Likelihood-Ratio therefore indicates that a high output Hx  is more
likely to be derived from a high effort Ha  than from a low effort La . Therefore,
( ) ( )( )
0
/
>
¶
¶
i
axax LiHi . According to
Bayes’ Theorem the likelihood that an observed output ix  is derived from a high effort Ha  can be determined as follows:
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )LiLHiH
HiH
iH aqxaxaqxax
aqxaxqax
||
||
+
= ( )
( )
( )
( )Hi
Li
H
L
ax
ax
ax
ax
+
=
1
1 . If the Likelihood-Ratio is applied, then
( ) ( )( ) 0/ <
¶
¶
i
axax HiLi . The denominator decreases in ix . As a consequence ( ) iiH qax ¶¶ /|  increases. The higher the
observed output ix , the higher the probability that it was realized by a high effort Ha .
If the Likelihood-Ratio is used, the output can be interpreted as a ‘sound’ signal for the effort taken by the Service Provider.
Therefore, it can be used as a basis for an incentive-scheme within an optimal contract.
IMPACTS FOR OUTSOURCING RELATIONSHIPS DERIVED FROM AGENCY-THEORY
The previous section presented the formal deduction of the Principal-Agent-Problem for an outsourcing relationship taking
the outsourcing of IT-Infrastructure-Services as an example. In equation (9) we showed that within an optimal contract the
marginal utilities of both parties involved have to be proportional to each other. Furthermore, the fee payable to the Service
Provider  depends  on  the  Likelihood-Ratio  as  an  indicator  for  the  effort  actually  taken by the  Service  Provider.  These  two
results are analyzed in further detail in the following sections. As symmetrical distributed information cannot be assumed in
reality, the focus of the following is on asymmetrically distributed information (i.e. second-best-solution).
Results Derived from the Ratio of Marginal Utilities
We first focus on the left side of equation (9) by analyzing possible values for the ratio of marginal utilities. The results and
consequences of the respective values are described in the following Table 1.
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Table 1. Overview – Ratio of Marginal Utilities
In Case 1 the value of ratio of marginal utilities equals or is smaller than zero. This implies that one party can increase its
utility only at the cost of the other party, or; one party is not affected at all. Therefore, no contract will be signed. In Case 2
the ratio of marginal utilities equals one. Consequently, the implied benefits and risks will be equally shared. Case 3 refers to
the possibility that the ratio of marginal utilities is larger than zero and smaller than one. In this scenario, the Outsourcer’s
marginal utility is smaller than that of the Service Provider. It is therefore difficult to set up an incentive system for the
Service Provider as they are already better of than the Outsourcer is. In Case 4 the Outsourcer is better off as the marginal
utilities is greater than one. In this case, an incentive compatible Penalty-Reward-System offers great advantages to the
Outsourcer. The Service Provider is in an inferior position regarding their marginal utility. The marginal utility of the
Outsourcer increases more than that of the Service Provider. Therefore, the Outsourcer have to provide the Service Provider
with incentives via the Likelihood-Ratio. This incentive should work in a way that a higher effort taken by the Service
Provider is rewarded with a relatively high payment. Thereby, the Service Provider is able to increase their marginal utility.
Answering the first research question, our theoretical findings show that the marginal utilities of both parties involved have to
be proportional to arrive at an ‘optimal’ contract. The ratio of marginal utilities implies for our outsourcing example that a
decrease in the Outsourcer’s costs has to be accompanied by an increase of the Service Provider’s profit. In reality, this
proportionality can be implemented by the agreement of respective contract clauses. During expert interviews it turned out
that there are two possibilities for such an implementation.
First, a contract mechanism that comprises three different clauses which can be agreed upon. During contract negotiations the
Outsourcer and the Service Provider have to disclose their cost calculations. This is a challenging but important step towards
an optimal contract. Based on this information (1) a pricing scheme that is advantageous for both parties has to be agreed
upon. To ensure proportionality of the respective cost functions in the long run, (2) a price cap combined with a (3)
renegotiation option has to be implemented. If, for example during the outsourcing of IT-Infrastructure-Services the number
of used server capacity exceeds or falls below a certain limit, prices have to be renegotiated again. Due to economies of scale
and scope the Service Provider should be able to reduce unit costs when volumes increase. In turn, if volumes decrease they
may increase fees due to reduced economies of scale and scope. Second, both parties can agree upon a pricing scheme that
reflects proportionality of cost functions without exactly disclosing them. This can be implemented by an agreement on
graduated prices (e.g. the usage of 1,000 to 5,000 MIPS within one month costs 2,000 €, the usage of 5,001 to 10,000 MIPS
costs 3,000 €, etc.). Here, the unit price also decreases when volumes increase due to the realization of further economies of
scale and scope one the side of the Service Provider.
Results Derived from the Likelihood-Ratio
As shown in Table 1 the ratio of marginal utilities – which is subject to negotiations – can have different values. The
importance of the Likelihood-Ratio depends on the respective value. The Likelihood-Ratio is a ‘sound’ indicator regarding
the level of effort taken by the Service Provider. To illustrate this again, the relationship between the Likelihood-Ratio and
the other variables introduced in the Principal-Agent-Setting is highlighted in the following Figure 1.
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a
x
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Figure 1. Overview – Input Variables
The random state of nature q  and the effort a  are the two variables that influence the output. As the random state of nature
cannot be influenced, a  is the only variable that can be affected. Providing incentives ex ante influences action a  chosen by
the Service Provider. By observing the Likelihood-Ratio
),(
),(
axf
axfa  it can be determined whether or not the outcome is based
on a high effort level chosen by the Service Provider. The Likelihood-Ratio indicates the impact of effort a  on output x .
Not achieving a high output x  indicates that the Service Provider put a low effort in producing this output. Depending on the
value of this ratio a respective Penalty-Reward-System should be set-up. The following Figure 2 illustrates the mechanisms
that should be incorporated in such a system.
First Best
f(x)
x
Output
Below ‘First
Best’ð
‘Punish’
Output Slightly
Above ‘First
Best’ð ‘Pay
Fee Agreed
Upon’
Output above
‘First Best’ð
‘Reward’
Incentive
Compatible
Contract
Figure 2. Overview - Penalty-Reward-System
Within the above Penalty-Reward-System low payments )(xsL  are agreed upon if the Outsourcer observes low outcomes
Lx  (left part of Figure 2). Thereby, the Service Provider have an incentive to choose a high effort as they would otherwise be
‘punished’. In contrast, high outcomes should be rewarded with high payments to incite high efforts (right part of Figure 2).
Answering our second research question, the Outsourcer should implement incentives based on the outcome. The Likelihood-
Ratio is a ‘sound’ signal whether or not the outcome was achieved with a high effort. Case 2 and Case 4 in Table 1 are most
suited to implement a Penalty-Reward-System based on the Likelihood-Ratio. In reality, the observed outcome should be
measured and penalized/rewarded based on a Service-Level-Framework. According to Domberger, Fernandez and Fiebig
(2000), Service-Levels should, for example, comprehend agreements on service availability, response in emergencies,
accuracy, and minimization of downtime.
Summing up, during contract negotiations a variable compensation scheme (i.e. a fixed-fee per unit, but a variable amount in
volumes) that considers proportionality of marginal utilities of the parties involved should be agreed upon. The Penalty-
Reward-System — which is also determined during contact negotiations — should be based on the observable outcome.
Final compensation of the Service Provider therefore consists of the unit-based fee and the penalties/rewards which depend
on the observed outcome. Whether or not these theoretical findings are implemented in real contracts will be analyzed in
further detail in the next section based on a single case study.
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EVIDENCE BASED ON SINGLE CASE STUDY RESEARCH
Methodology
To achieve the necessary rigor, case studies need to be prepared and carried out thoroughly. It is important during design and
preparation to explicit the research question, propositions, and unit of analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989b). The research questions
employed for these case studies are ‘What’ and ‘How’ questions. These types of questions are considered appropriate for case
studies (Yin, 2003). The propositions used in our cases are grounded theoretically (see section 3 “Formal derivation of the
Principal-Agent-Problem”). As unit of analysis we chose outsourcing relationships.
We interviewed the project manager, the contract manager, and the manager of the retained organization of an IT-
Infrastructure-Outsourcing deal. From the project manager we wanted to learn more about the history of the outsourcing deal.
The contract manager and the manager of the retained organization provided us with details on how the contract and its set up
is actually ‘working’ and whether a ‘fair’ sharing of risk and reward takes place.
The pre-structured interviews lasted about four hours and were conducted by two researchers. The interview partners
provided us with additional contract documentation. The answers given together with the respective documents were,
analyzed and refined based on Eisenhardt (1989b) and Yin (2003). The interviewees reviewed and validated the collected
case study data and reports. This procedure follows the literature on single case study methodology (Lee, 1989).
Case Study Analysis
Our research analyzes an outsourcing deal of IT-Infrastructure-Services within the European Banking Industry. The banking
industry has been chosen due to its business being IT-intense. The findings relevant for our research are summarized in the
following Table 2.
Characteristics Bank A
Outsourced service: IT Infrastructure Services
Deal volume (per year): > 1,000,000 €
Percentage of outsourced sub-processes
compared to the overall process:
> 90%
Outsourcing objectives: - Cost savings
- Variabilization of fixed costs
- Quality improvements
- Standardization
- Risk reduction
Familiarity of outsourcer with service provider's cost calculation Only the basic cost drivers are known
Familiarity of service provider with outsourcer's cost calculation No
Equal sharing of risk and reward (outsourcer's perception) No
Understanding of the relationship as a partnership
(outsourcer's perception)
Outsourcer feels that they are on the way to establish a
partnership
Existence of jointly negotiated SLAs Yes
Combination of SLAs with a Penalty-Reward-System Yes
Regular controlling of SLAs Yes, once a month SLAs are controlled. Twice a year the
respective penalties/rewards are settled.
Table 2. Overview – Case Study Results
Bank A does not know any details regarding their Service Provider’s cost calculation. They are only familiar with the basic
cost drivers as prior to outsourcing the service was provided in-house. In turn, they do not think that the Service Provider is
aware of their cost calculation. This indicates that during contract negotiations the respective cost calculations have not been
disclosed by neither party. Furthermore, no graduated pricing has been agreed upon. Bank A thinks that risk and return are
not shared equally. However, they believe that they are on the way to establish a partnership with their Service Provider.
According to Saunders, Gebelt and Hu (1997) a true sharing of risk and return needs to take place to establish a partnership.
Therefore, from an academic perspective they are far from establishing a true partnership. This case highlights the importance
of disclosing utility functions (e.g. cost calculations within the outsourcing) to arrive at a ‘fair’ sharing of risk and reward.
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Bank A and their Service Provider have agreed upon Service Level Agreements (SLAs). These SLAs include agreements on
service availability and timeliness, response in emergencies, accuracy, and minimization of systems’ downtime as suggested
by Domberger et al. (2000). The SLAs are linked to a Penalty-Reward-System. Thereby, Bank A provides their Service
Provider with an incentive to act in their interest. To determine the degree of fulfillment of the contracted services, Bank A
has set up a monitoring system that captures the actual fulfillment of all services. Thereby, Bank A relies on the output as a
‘sound’ signal for the effort actually taken by the Service Provider. Overall, Bank A is satisfied with the service delivery of
their Service Provider. They feel that their Penalty-Reward-System is working well as on average penalties are imposed only
twice a year. Therefore, we understand that Bank A’s incentive system is working properly as it provides the Service
Provider with incentives to deliver the services agreed upon in a high quality and timely manner.
We conclude that the establishment of respective mechanisms to ensure proportionality of utility/cost functions is of utmost
importance to set up a partnership with a true sharing of risk and reward. This can be reached by either agreeing on contract
mechanisms that comprehend different clauses or by negotiating graduated prices. The probability that the Service Provider
chooses a disadvantageous action can be minimized by synchronizing the objectives of the Out- and Insourcer through the
negotiation of SLAs ex ante and agreeing on Penalty-Reward-Mechanisms which become effective ex post. Thereby, the
asymmetric distributed information between both parties can be reduced.
CONCLUSION
Our research contributes in two ways. For academia, our research provides a detailed analysis of contract design based on a
sound theoretical foundation, namely, the Principal-Agent-Model. So far, there is a lack of research on normative Principal-
Agent-Theory addressing outsourcing contracts. We are aware that a contract represents the results of bilateral negotiations.
However, Outsourcers can benefit from our research by knowing which mechanisms and clauses should be especially
carefully negotiated as they greatly influence the outcome of the outsourcing deal.
Our research is limited in two ways. First, generalization is limited as evidence is based on single case study research.
Second, like Holmström (1979) and Ross (1973), we assume that the Service Provider is risk-averse. We suggest for further
research to also analyze the case of the Service Provider being risk-neutral.
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